Start with the stored files
In the current Veil implementation, file contents and the space index are encrypted on the device. The index includes names, folders and notes. Your pattern opens the space through its protected key material. This is a description of the implementation, not a claim of an independent security audit.
A strong key does not make every pattern strong
A short or predictable pattern can be guessed. Choose one that other people cannot easily observe or infer, and keep the recovery code private. The app slows repeated failed unlock attempts, but that does not guarantee protection against someone attacking a copied set of encrypted files outside the app.
Previews and exports create another boundary
To display some formats, such as videos and PDFs, Veil creates temporary decrypted files protected by iOS. It clears its temporary directory on locking and startup. An exported file is different: the receiving app or destination controls that copy, and it may remain there after you lock Veil.
Locking is useful, not magic
Veil locks when it goes into the background. When it detects screen recording or mirroring, it pauses access. This does not prevent screenshots, another camera, a compromised device or every possible memory copy. Separate patterns also do not make the existence of stored spaces forensically invisible.
Keep the recovery path under your control
Encryption makes a good backup routine more important. Keep an encrypted backup and its matching code in separate, reachable places. Test restoration with disposable content. Veil cannot reset a forgotten pattern for you through a support email.
What is available now
Local storage, file backup and recovery are implemented. Production iCloud, sharing and device sync are not enabled in the preview. Those services need their own configuration and real-device validation before release. The current app includes no advertising or analytics SDKs. Read the privacy page for the separate handling of purchases, support and website requests.